We consider the secret key agreement problem under the multiterminal source model proposed by Csiszár and Narayan. A single-letter characterization of the secrecy capacity is desired but remains unknown except in the extreme case with unlimited public discussion and without wiretapper's side information. Taking the problem to the opposite extreme by requiring the public discussion rate to be zero asymptotically, we obtain the desired characterization under surprisingly general setting with wiretapper's side information, silent users, trusted and untrusted helpers. An immediate consequence of the result is that the capacity with nearly no discussion is the same as the capacity with no discussion, resolving a previous conjecture in the affirmative. The idea of the proof is to characterize the capacity in the special case with neither wiretapper's side information nor untrusted helpers using a multivariate extension of Gács-Körner common information, and then extend the result to the general setting by a change of scenario that turns untrusted helpers into trusted helpers. We further show how to evaluate the capacity explicitly for finite linear sources and discuss how the current result can be extended to improve and unify existing bounds on the capacity for strictly positive discussion rates.
particular, the model in [13] and [14] do not cover the case where all users are silent as the proof technique relies on having at least one user with unbounded discussion rate. There is also no obvious multiterminal extension of the capacity characterizations in the case of two active users [3, 9, 17] , especially the converse proofs that rely on the Csiszár-sum identity. Furthermore, the characterization [17] for interactive discussion does not involve wiretapper's side information. The characterization in [17] is based on the idea of [18] that uses the interactive source coding result of [19] . The characterization is hard to evaluate as it involves a large number of auxiliary random variables that grows in the number of rounds of interactive discussion, which may go unbounded. There are other bounding techniques for the multiterminal secrecy capacity such as the lamination bound in [20, Theorem 4.3] [21] and the helper-set bound in [20, Theorem 4.1] . However, lamination does not extend beyond hypergraphical sources, while the helper-set bound was shown to be loose for a simple example in [20, Fig. 2 ] at asymptotically zero discussion rate. Despite all these challenges, we found that the capacity at asymptotically zero discussion has a simple characterization and resolved the previous conjecture in the affirmative as a special case.
The paper is organized as follows: We will formulate the problem in Section II, and give the main results in Section III followed by some discussion of the results in Section IV and their proofs in the Appendix.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
We shall consider the multiterminal source model for secret key generation introduced in [10] , which is specified by a finite set V of |V | ≥ 2 users and a discrete memoryless multiple source
taking values in the finite alphabet Z V := i∈V Z i , and distributed jointly according to P ZV . We remark here that we will be using the sans serif font for random variables and the normal font for their alphabet sets. The secret key agreement can be broken into a sequence of phases as follows.
In the private observation phase, each user i ∈ V observes n i.i.d. samples Z n i := (Z i1 , . . . , Z in ) of the ith component source Z i . In the private randomization phase, user i ∈ V can generate a private random variable U i independent of the private sources Z n V . Altogether
where U V = (U i | i ∈ V ). 1 To agree upon a secret key, all users except for a subset S ⊆ V of silent users are allowed to communicate interactively over a public noiseless channel during the public communication phase. This implies that the communication sent by some user i may depend on its accumulated observations. More precisely, at the t-th instant where t ∈ {1, 2, . . . , r} for some chosen integer r, some vocal user i t ∈ V broadcasts a messagẽ F t as a function of the previous messagesF t−1 := (F τ | τ ≤ t) and the private observation (Z n it , U it ) of the user i t , i.e.,
1 The private randomization variables may be continuous.
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For convenience, we denote the entire sequence of public messages by
The rate of the public communication is given by lim sup n→∞ 1 n log |F |, where F is the range of F. Following the public communication, a predetermined subset A ⊆ V of |A| ≥ 2 users need to agree upon a secret key K taking values in the set K. We also assume that another predetermined subset D ⊆ V , D ∩ A = ∅, of users are being tapped by the wiretapper. The set A is referred to as the set of active users, the set D is called the set of untrusted helpers, whereas the users in V \ (A ∪ D) will be referred to as the trusted helpers. We remark that each user in A must be able to recover K from its accumulated observations. On the other hand, any wiretapper listening to the public communication and having access to the untrusted helpers' observation, should be oblivious to K. In other words, we want K to be 'almost independent' of (F, Z n D ). More precisely, we need K to satisfy the following recoverability and secrecy constraints: There exists some functions φ i , for i ∈ V , such that
The rate of the secret key K is defined to be lim inf n→∞ 1 n log |K|. We define the secrecy capacity with a total communication rate R ≥ 0 by
(3b)
We are interested in characterizing C S (0), namely, the secrecy capacity with asymptotically zero discussion rate. It is important to point out that our formulation covers the model with wiretapper's side information by the sources Z S∩D of the silent untrusted helpers. This is because having a wiretapper observe some side information Z directly is equivalent to having the wiretapper observe it through the source of a silent untrusted helper. Since a silent untrusted user cannot discuss, its knowledge of the side information cannot affect the secrecy capacity. The formulation also cover the case with no discussion by allowing S to be the entire set V , unlike [13, 14] which require the S to be a proper subset of A.
We should remark here that the secrecy constraint appearing in (2b) is referred to as weak secrecy in the literature.
Several works including [10] study a stronger secrecy criteria, referred to as strong secrecy, obtained by removing the 1 n term from (2b). Our results are valid for both the weak secrecy and the strong secrecy criteria. We choose to define secrecy using the weak secrecy criteria since the main bottleneck in our proof is the converse part, i.e., obtaining an upper bound on C S (0). Noting that a key satisfying strong secrecy will by default satisfy weak secrecy, an upper bound on C S (0) defined using weak secrecy will therefore automatically translate to an upper bound on C S (0) defined using strong secrecy. April 26, 2019 DRAFT
III. MAIN RESULTS
The main result is the following single-letter characterization of the secrecy capacity at asymptotically zero discussion rate, in the presence of active users A, trusted helpers (V \ A) \ D, untrusted helpers D and silent users S:
The secrecy capacity at asymptotically zero discussion rate is
where G is a solution to
Furthermore, the capacity can be achieved with no discussion.
✷
Note that the capacity does not depend on S, i.e., the capacity remains unchanged whether a user is silent or not. This is consistent with the fact that the capacity can be achieved without discussion. Furthermore, notice that the capacity does not depend on the sources Z (V \A)\D of the trusted helpers because the solution G to (5) depends only on the sources Z A of the active users. In other words, the capacity remains unchanged even if the trusted helpers were removed, i.e., with V reassigned as A ∪ D. This is expected because, according to the secret key agreement protocol, helpers need not share the secret key but may help improve the secrecy capacity via public discussion. However, the fact that the capacity can be achieved with no discussion means that the trusted helpers cannot improve the capacity by discussion. Similarly, untrusted helpers cannot increase the capacity by discussion but their presence may diminish the capacity because the capacity H(G|Z D ) with untrusted helpers is no larger than the capacity H(G) without untrusted helpers. This is again expected because the sources Z D of the untrusted helpers are leaked to the wiretapper, and so the common randomness between G and Z D cannot be used for the secret key. (5) is a multivariate extension of the Gács-Körner common information first introduced by Gács and Körner in [5] for the case of two users. The optimal G is unique up to bijections and referred to as the maximal common function (m.c.f.) of Z i for i ∈ A. The fact G is called a common function is because the constraint
is a strictly better solution to (5) . Once again, the fact that the capacity can be achieved with no discussion is consistent with its characterization via the maximal common function that every active user can compute from their source without discussion. We remark that, while it is obvious the characterization of the capacity is achievable with no discussion, proving that the characterization is the best achievable rate is non-trivial, especially when public discussion, albeit of zero rate, is allowed. We will give the proof of the main result in Appendix A, and an alternative proof for the case with no discussion in Appendix C to explain the non-triviality involved in handling the case with public discussion.
While a single-letter characterization is widely accepted as a computable solution in Information Theory, the computation is often very difficult due to optimization over auxiliary random variables such as the maximal common April 26, 2019 DRAFT function G in our case. For the characterization to be useful, it is important to be able to compute it efficiently.
Fortunately, there does exist a systematic method called the ergodic decomposition to compute the Gác-Körner common information [5] , and such a method can be directly extended to the multivariate case using an inductive argument, similar to the inductive proofs in the appendix. However, the computation is exponential in the number of random variables, and it is hard to give an explicit expression for the Gác-Körner common information for large networks. For the remainder of this section, we introduce a broad class of correlated random sources, called the finite linear source model, and give a polynomial-time computable expression for the maximal common function and therefore the secrecy capacity.
Definition 1 ([22])
A source Z V is said to be a finite linear source if its component can be written up to bijections 2 as
where x is a uniform random vector with elements taking values from some finite field F q , and M i is a deterministic matrix with elements from F q .
✷ Theorem 2 For finite linear sources, the solution to (5), i.e., the m.c.f. of Z i for i ∈ A, is given by
where M is a matrix whose column space is
namely the intersection of the column spaces of all M i for i ∈ A. M is also the maximum common subspace
Therefore, the Gác-Körner common information is given by
namely the dimension of the maximum common subspace in log q bits.
✷
The proof of Theorem 2 is given in Appendix B. In the presence of untrusted helpers, the secrecy capacity in (4) is simply
where M is a matrix whose column space satisfies (8) . We conclude this section by giving an example of a finite linear source and computing its Gác-Körner common information.
Example 1 Let X a , X b , and X c be uniformly random and independent bits. Consider
and set
This is a finite linear source because, with x := [ Xa,X b ,Xc ],
, and x is uniformly distributed over F 2 2 . Note also that C S (0) = J GK (Z A ) by (4). Before computing G in (7), notice that M 1 does not have full column rank because the last column is the sum of the first two. We may remove the last column and consider instead
Therefore, the matrix
The primary goal of multiterminal secret key agreement is to understand how users should discuss to share a secret key not known to a wiretapper. By characterizing the secrecy capacity as a function of the public discussion rates of individual users, we gained valuable insights of the theoretical limits and the achieving schemes. The characterization of upper and lower bounds also inspired meaningful information measures and their properties applicable to other related problems. Despite the challenges of characterizing the capacity in the two-user case under the basic source model, we obtained a simple and meaningful characterization by requiring the discussion rate to go to zero asymptotically. The characterization is a result of a better understanding of the Gács-Körner common information and its appropriate multivariate extension.
In contrast to the result [4] that public discussion improves the secret key rate, our work conveys the opposite message that one cannot improve the secret key rate by public discussion at asymptotically zero discussion rate.
Despite such a negative result, our work demonstrates how one can characterize the secrecy capacity in the multiterminal case with public discussion at limited rate. While this work focuses on asymptotically zero discussion rate, the proof techniques can be extended to the case with strictly positive discussion rate. There are various existing bounds on the secret capacity for positive discussion rate but they have obvious limitations. For the multiterminal April 26, 2019 DRAFT setting, the best upper bounds are the helper-set bound and lamination bounds in [20, 21] . While the helper-set bound is tight for a special class of pairwise independent networks (PIN) [20, It difficult to extend our result to give a single-letter characterization for positive discussion rates as the two-user case remains unsolved [17] . However, we believe it is possible to resolve the conjecture in [23] that the decremental secret key agreement scheme in [24] achieves the capacity for hypergraphical sources. In particular, the resulting characterization of the communication complexity may be viewed as an asymptotic counter-part of that of [25] for non-asymptotic hypergraphical sources, but without the assumption that the discussion is linear. Note that the decremental secret key agreement scheme can be extended to the compressed secret key agreement scheme in [26] .
Therefore, a more general result applicable beyond hypergraphical sources would be an optimality condition for compressed secret key agreement that can be satisfied for any hypergraphical sources using decremental secret key agreement. We remark that the capacity was characterized for the PIN model [20, Theorem 4.4] only in the case without helpers, as the achieving scheme uses the tree-packing protocol [27] , which is not optimal in the case with helpers. Hence, a less ambitious goal is to characterize the capacity for the PIN model with helpers.
APPENDIX A PROOF OF THEOREM 1
In this section, we derive the characterization (4) of the secrecy capacity at asymptotically zero discussion rate and show that the capacity can be achieved with neither discussion nor private randomization. We first show the achievability, i.e., one can choose the secret key at rate H(G|Z D ) with no public discussion while satisfying the recoverability and secrecy constraints in (2) . By the balanced coloring Lemma [10, Lemma B.3] 3 , there exists a choice of K satisfying the conditions
The first equality implies the secrecy constraint (2b) while the recoverability constraint (2a) follows from the fact that G is a common function computable by the active users with no discussion. The last equality implies that the secret key rate is H(G|Z D ) as desired. This completes the proof of achievability.
For the converse proof, it suffices to consider the case without silent users, i.e., S = ∅, because the bound for this case also applies to the case with silent users. Compared to the proof of achievability, the converse proof is more complicated and will be broken into two steps: We first prove for the case without untrusted helpers that C S (0) ≤ J GK (Z A ); Then, we consider the case with untrusted users and extend the result to prove C S (0) ≤ H(G|Z D ) in (4). More precisely, to make use of the result for the case without untrusted helpers, we will consider a change of scenario that turns untrusted helpers into trusted helpers. Roughly speaking, if K is a feasible secret key for the original scenario with untrusted helpers, it is also a feasible secret key for the modified scenario. Since the key rate for the modified scenario with no untrusted helper is upper bounded by Gác-Körner common information, we can argue that 1 n H(K|G n ) goes to 0, i.e., the randomness in K is primarily from that of the m.c.f. G. This will imply the desired capacity upper bound H(G|Z D ) for the original scenario with untrusted helpers because the randomness in Z D cannot be used for the secret key.
We remark that our approach is different from the converse proof in [9] that handles the wiretapper's side information, or equivalently, the source of silent untrusted helpers by the Csiszár-sum identity. It appears that the technique using Csiszár-sum identity is limiting and does not extend to the multiterminal setting involving more than two active users.
A. Proof of converse without untrusted helpers
The converse proof for the case with untrusted helpers follows a similar single-letterization technique as in [9] and uses the following property of the m.c.f.:
the Markov conditions
imply the Markov condition
where G is the m.c.f. of Z i for i ∈ A.
✷
The Lemma can be viewed as a multivariate extension of the double Markov inequality [28, Problem 16.25] , which is the special case when |A| = 2 and A = V .
PROOF The Markov conditions (A1) means that Q and Z B are independent given Z i for all i ∈ A, i.e.,
It follows that
Note that f i (Z i ) on the left is possibly random because Z i is. The above condition means that f (q) (Z B ) is a common function of Z i for i ∈ A, and so it must be a function of the maximal common function G by [5] . (See also the explanation below (5).) Hence,
which implies the desired Markov condition (A2). The first equality is because G is a function of Z B . The last equality is because f
For the desired converse proof, we will apply the above Lemma with A = B. More precisely, we will show that
where the maximization is over all possible P Q|ZA . Applying Lemma A1 with B = A, the constraint in (A3) implies (A1) and so I(Q ∧ Z A |G) = 0 by (A2). By the data processing inequality,
and so (A3) implies the desired bound
It remains to prove (A3). Let J be uniformly distributed over {1, 2, . . . , n} and independent of everything else,
By the secrecy constraint (2b), we have
where we use δ n to denote a sufficiently large non-negative real number going to 0 sufficiently slow as n → ∞.
Next, we will bound 1 and 2 as follows: On one hand,
where the second equality is because I(Z j−1 A ∧ Z Aj ) = 0, for all j ∈ n, by the memorylessness (1) of the source.
On the other hand, assuming 1, 2 ∈ A without the loss of generality, (1) . A more detailed derivation is as follows:
, which, after rearrangement, leads to (a); (b) follows from the fact that
by the recoverability constraint (2a); (c) is because conditioning cannot increase entropy, and (d) is by the assumption that the discussion rate is asymptotically zero, i.e., H(F) ≤ log |F | ≤ nδ n . Therefore,
Since the discussion rate is asymptotically zero, we have for any i ∈ A
where the third inequality follows from the recoverability constraint (2a); the second equality is because I(U A ∧ Z n A ) = I(U A ∧ Z n i ) = 0 by the assumption (1) of the private randomization; the third equality follows from the chain rule expansion and by the memorylessness (1) of the source. Therefore,
Combining (A4) and (A5), and using the fact that P Z V J = P ZV , we have
The above maximization is over all possible choices of P Q|ZA . The solution exists because, using the Carathéodory-Fenchel-Eggleston Theorem, it can be argued that the support of Q can be bounded uniformly for all δ > 0. (See for example [28, Lemmas 3.4, 3.5] .) Γ(δ) is also continuous in δ by the continuity of the entropy function [29] for discrete random variables with finite alphabet sets. Hence,
which gives (A3) as desired.
We remark that the above derivation does not invoke the Csiszár-sum identity. The auxiliary random variable Q comes from Q J , which is obtained by simple chain-rule expansion of the i.i.d. samples of the sources. We found that the problem of extending the single-letterization in [9] using Csiszár-sum identity is that the Csiszár-sum identity involves expanding the sources in only two directions, which does not allow for a common definition of auxiliary random variable in the case with more than two active users.
B. Proof of converse with untrusted helpers
In this section, we extend the above converse proof for the case without untrusted helpers to the case with Consider any feasible secret key K and discussion F at asymptotically zero rate satisfying the recoverability and secrecy constraints (2). Furthermore, assume 1 ∈ A without loss of generality and letK := φ 1 (F, Z n 1 , U 1 ) be the secret key estimate generated by user 1. It follows from the recoverability constraint (2a) and Fano's inequality that
Again, we use δ n to denote a non-negative real number that is sufficiently large and that goes to 0 sufficiently slowly as n goes to infinity.
Next, we modify the scenario by setting D = ∅. A, V , S, and Z V remain unchanged. Instead of using n to denote the block length, we will use nn ′ as the block length where n ′ is a positive integer. To distinguish the modified scenario from the original scenario, we will denote the secrecy capacity of the modified scenario by C ′ S instead of C S . Similarly, we will use K ′ and F ′ to denote the secret key and public discussion for the modified scenario. By the converse proof in the previous section, we have
We will show using the above bound that
and so, by the secrecy constraint (2b),
which implies C S (0) ≤ H(G|Z D ), thereby establishing the desired result.
It remains to show (A9), which means that the randomness in K comes primarily from the m.c.f. G. Consider the modified scenario with D = ∅. We first show that there exists a public discussion F ′ at asymptotically zero rate such thatK n ′ can be recovered by every active user asymptotically in n ′ , i.e., 
where the first inequality implies the desired secrecy constraint for the modified scenario. By the last inequality and the capacity bound (A8) for the case without untrusted helpers, we have
where the last inequality is because F has zero rate asymptotically in n. Rearranging the terms and letting n ′ goes to infinity, we have
By (A7), H(K|G n ) ≤ 2nδ n , which implies (A9) as desired.
APPENDIX B PROOF OF THEOREM 2
To prove Theorem 2, we shall make use of the following technical Lemma.
Lemma B1 For any finite linear (Z 1 , Z 2 ), we have
where M is a matrix satisfying
✷ PROOF By standard arguments in linear algebra, there exists matrices N 1 and N 2 such that
for i ∈ {1, 2}. It follows that there is a bijection between Z i and x [ M N i ]. To prove the Lemma, i.e., (B1), it suffices to show that
We will argue the stronger claim that xM , xN 1 , and xN 2 are mutually independent. Since x is uniformly random by Definition 1, it suffices to show
The first equality implies xM is independent of xN 1 , while the second equality means that (xM , xN 1 ) is independent of xN 2 as desired. The first equality holds by the construction of N 1 . The second equality holds because, otherwise, some column of
This completes the proof of the Lemma.
A interesting Corollary of the above Lemma is the following equivalence of bivariate Gác-Körner common information, Shannon mutual information, and Wyner common information.
Corollary B1 For any finite linear source (Z 1 , Z 2 ), we have
where J GK and J W denotes the Gác-Körner common information and Wyner common information respectively:
Furthermore, the solution to (B3) and (B4) are given by xM in Lemma B1.
✷ PROOF It was shown in [8] that (B2) holds with equalities replaced by ≤ in general for any sources. For the finite linear source, the reverse inequalities will follow by showing that xM in Lemma B1 is a solution to both (B3) and (B4) because that implies
because it is a common function of Z 1 and Z 2 . xM is a solution to (B4) by (B1).
Note that the above Corollary implies Theorem 2 for the case |A| = 2. We now prove Theorem 2 by induction on |A|. Assume the inductive hypothesis that for any j ∈ A, the m.c.f. of Z i for i ∈ A \ {j}, i.e., the solution to
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can be strictly larger the multivariate mutual information
where Π(V ) denotes the set of partitions of V . A simple example can be constructed using the the characterization of the Wyner common in [7] for the hypergraphical source model, which is a special case of the finite linear source model. Nevertheless, similar to the multivariate Gác-Körner common information, the multivariate Wyner common information can also be explicitly evaluated for finite linear sources using linear algebra.
APPENDIX C ALTERNATIVE PROOF OF THEOREM 1 FOR THE CASE WITH NO DISCUSSION
In this section, we extend the property [9, Lemma 1.1] of the m.c.f. to the multivariate case, which will lead to an alternative converse proof of Theorem 1 in the case without private randomization nor public discussion is allowed, i.e., the case when U V is constant and S = V .
Lemma C1 Let G be the m.c.f. of Z i for i ∈ A with |A| ≥ 2, i.e., the solution to J GK (Z A ) in (5) . For any ǫ > 0, there exists δ > 0 independent of n such that
for some functions φ A and θ. The recoverability constraint (2a) without private randomization implies the antecedent of the implication (C1)
for sufficiently large n, and so the consequence of (C1) holds with ǫ going to 0 sufficiently slowly in n, i.e., 
for some δ ′ > 0 independent of n. Choosing δ = min{δ ′ , δ ′′ /2}, which is independent of n, the antecedent of (C1) implies both (C3) and (C5), which imply the consequence of (C1) as desired.
We remark that the converse proof in Section A-B is stronger because it applies to the more general case with public discussion at zero rate. If there is public discussion, the recoverability constraint (2a) may not imply the antecedent of (C1) while Lemma C1 does not appear to extend to the case with public discussion. In particular,
[9, Lemma 1.1] relies on a property of the Hirschfeld-Gebelein-Rényi maximal correlation that appears to fail to incoporate the public discussion.
